A - F[ edit ] In a sense
Homework Helper Gold Member I'm very puzzled here by your comment, especially the one that you made in the very beginning in which you don't think the points that I made regarding emergent phenomena has anything to do with "reducibility" or not.
In fact, Bedau uses as an example, micelles, just as Laughlin does, to discuss emergence: Macro entities and micro entities each have various kinds of properties. Some of the kinds of properties that characterize a macro entity can also apply to its micro constituents; others cannot.
For example, consider microcelles. Those polymers are themselves composed out of hydro-phyllic and —phobic monomers. In this context, the micelles are macro objects, while the individual monomeric molecules are micro objects.
The micelles and the monomers both have certain kinds of physical properties in common having a location, mass, etc. By contrast, some of the properties of micelles such as their permeability are the kind of properties that monomers simply cannot possess.
The only point I make here is that the intent of Bedau and others is to define emergence and give examples, and not simply create logical arguments without application to the real world. We are then left with weak and strong emergence.
Weak emergence applies in contexts in which there is a system, call it S, composed out of "micro-level" parts; the number and identity of these parts might change over time. S has various "macro-level" states macrostates and various "micro-level" states microstates. S's microstates are the intrinsic states of its parts and it's macrostates are structural properties constituted wholly out of microstates.
Interesting macrostates typically average over microstates and so compresses microstate information. Further, there is a microdynamic, call it D, which governs the time evolution of S's microstates. One could interpret this definition as the macrostates reduce to the individual microstates, but that is not all Bedau has in mind here.
He says, However, weak emergence postulates just complicated mechanism with context-sensitive micro-level interactions. Rather than rejecting reduction, it [weak emergence] requires ontological and causal reduction, for these are what make derivation by simulation possible.
Weak emergence also applies directly to natural systems, whether or not anyone constructs a model or simulation of them. A derivation by simulation involves the temporal iteration of the spatial aggregation of local causal interactions among micro elements.
That is, it involves the local causal processes by which micro interactions give rise to macro phenomena. The notion clearly applies to natural systems as well as computer models. Weakly emergent phenomena are reducible, in principal.
Weak emergence is deducible were we to simply have sufficient computational ability. There would be no weakly emergent phenomena we could not deduce in principal. In fact, Conway proved that these gates can even be cunningly arranged so that they constitute a universal Turing machine Berlekamp et al.
Hence, the Game of Life can be configured in such a way that it can be interpreted as computing literally any possible algorithm operating on any possible input.
In fact, Turing machines are so reducible, they are deterministic ie: Also, so that weak emergence might be contrasted with strong emergence, because it is with strong emergence we enter into a bit of trouble.
We need a solid grasp on what is being called weak emergence and how it relates to reducibility before we move on to the strong variety. Bedau talks about two hallmarks of emergence: Emergent phenomena are dependent on underlying processes. Emergent phenomena are autonomous from underlying processes.
It is like viewing something as both transparent and opaque. The problem of emergence is to explain or explain away this apparent metaphysical unacceptability. It also sounds a lot like something that is irreducible. Superconductivity and the fractional quantum hall effect for example, might be viewed as being phenomena that are autonomous from the movement of specific particles.COARSE REDUCIBILITY AND ALGORITHMIC RANDOMNESS DENIS R.
HIRSCHFELDT, CARL G. JOCKUSCH, JR., RUTGER KUYPER, AND PAUL E. SCHUPP Abstract. A coarse description of a set A ⊆ ω is a set D ⊆ ω. churchland, kandel, dooyeweerd: reducibility of mind states detection of background ideas and the implications of these ideas at the level of worldviews; and to the development of a conceptual framework that may help to evaluate new theories in cognitive neuroscience.
3. Because the additive property is shown in the mind, the mind cannot be physically reduced in terms of relationships of cause and effects.
Keywords:Additive Property; Reducibility; Causality; Neuron; Mind Body. 1. Introduction.
Whether the mind is physically reducible or not is a topic that is still controversial. On Arnold's analysis, the content, or what is represented, has no role to play in the causal continuum that is essentially reducible to representations and the awareness of them.
Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind.
5 – The irreducibility of mind especially important.
He thinks this is a distinction that we should do our best to entrench, and he apparently sees “scientism” as an influence that somehow threatens this distinction, or threatens the mental vocabulary, and talks about it as “oppressive”.
Irreducible Mind depicts the mind as an entity independent of the brain or body, with which it causally interacts and the death of which it survives. The book "challenges neuroscientific reductionism"  as it argues that properties of minds cannot be fully explained by those of brains.